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The conception of social organization upon which the
foundations of the PM are constructed correlate directly
with the structural-conflict perspective within sociology.
The PM is a structural model that confronts how the
interrelations of state, market and ideology constrain
democracy. It predicts that patterns of media behavior are
connected to broader institutional and market imperatives.
It advances numerous hypotheses, which can be tested
empirically, utilizing the methodological techniques
associated with the model. Toward this end, evidence
supportive of the predictions advanced by the PM can be
seen to lend significant legitimacy to its preferred theoretic
and conceptual explanations regarding power and interrelations of state, corporate capitalism and the corporate
media. If concerned simply with the scientific utility of the
framework in question, the argument advanced by the
model holds together as a general framework and has
much utility. While the PM is highly interdisciplinary, we
suggest here that it connects directly with the ‘sociological
imagination.’ Exploring the PM’s potential within the sociological ‘field,’ we unpack reasons why the model represents a critical sociological approach to under-standing
media and society and consider the trajectory of its
reputational reception to date.
In terms of its basic underlying assumptions about the
dialectic between ideological and communicative power
and the structural organization of advanced capitalist
societies, the PM unequivocally shares the general
worldview associated with the structural-conflict or political
economy perspective, known as conflict theory within
mainstream sociology (see Mullen and Klaehn, 2010). The
term refers to a theoretical perspective within sociology
that derives from the work of Karl Marx; class conflict,
social inequality and ideological domination are main areas
of concern within conflict theory (see Marx, 1956). The
term also refers to the work of neo-Marxist thinkers, most
notably Antonio Gramsci (1971), the Frankfurt School (see
Marcuse, 1968; Adorno and Horkheimer, 1972), Althusser
(1969, 1971) and Poulantzas (1975). Radical mass media
criticism has long drawn upon the critical insights provided
by conflict theory (see Marx and Engels, 1970 [1845]);
Theobald (2006), for example, observed that: ‘Of central
importance within a genealogy of radical mass media
criticism is [Gramsci’s] view that current bourgeois control
of society, while certainly manifest in material modes of
production, is culturally embedded and naturalized in the
minds of the people via its hegemony over discourse.’
Europe has long been a central hub of radical mass media
criticism – notable figures included Raymond Williams,
Stuart Hall and the Glasgow University Media Group –
although internationally resonant contributions have been
made by a wide range of scholars from around the world
(see Carey, 1995; Parenti, 1986; Bourdieu, 1991, 1996;
McMurtry, 1998; McChesney, 1999, 2008; Miller and
Dinan, 2008; Giroux, 2001, 2010; Edwards and Cromwell,
2005, 2009; Cromwell, 2006; Chomsky, 1989, 1997a,
1997b, 1998; Herman, 1992, 1999; Herman and
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he Propaganda Model (hereafter PM) of media
behaviour advanced by Herman and Chomsky (1988)
is analytically and conceptually concerned to theorize the
intersection between communicative power and political
economy in contemporary capitalist society, specifically the
United States (US). Academic engagement with the PM is
typically limited to overviews of its five filters and brief
comments devoted to its predictions regarding the role and
function of media in contemporary society. Meanwhile,
relatively little attention has been accorded to the multiplicity of ways in which the PM intersects with central
theoretical concerns within the intellectual field of
sociology. This article suggests that the PM is directly
relevant to the discipline of sociology, and it begins by
highlighting the centrality of the concept of power in
relation to both sociology and the PM. The article then
introduces the three central hypotheses and five operative
principles of the PM before reviewing the nature of the
academic engagement with the PM to date.
Sociology is comprised of various and often competing
perspectives that share a common aim in striving to
discover knowledge/‘truths’ about social phenomena and
the social world. This article offers a sociologically
informed history of the PM, maps out the creation and
diffusion of its reputation as a relatively marginalized
conceptual model, and considers how its reputation has
been socially constructed. The relative ease with which the
PM’s first-order predictions may be applied and tested
empirically clearly demonstrate that the PM is centrally
concerned to discover knowledge/truths about patterns of
media behaviour. As noted, generally speaking, all sociological perspectives are inspired by the search for ‘truths’
and are comprised of sets of elaborate arguments. The
perceived strengths and limitations of various perspectives
can in part be gleamed by the extent to which
corresponding evidence suggests that the various hypotheses advanced are accurate and/or intuitively plausible
and serve some utility in explaining and under-standing
recurring, empirically specifiable patterns.
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O’Sullivan, 1990; Fairclough, 1995a, 1995b, 2002;
Bagdikian, 1992; Pilger, 1998; Jhally, 2006; and Winter,
1992, 1998, 2002, 2007; Alford, 2010). (See Theobald
(2006) and Berry (2010) for a detailed discussion of the
key figures associated with radical mass media criticism).
In short, conflict theory is concerned with discourse
phenomena within a multiplicity of geographical and
temporal contexts and, like the PM, is primarily concerned
with the question of how ideological power and material
power intersect and reinforce one another.
Both conflict theory and the PM take as given that:
power is manifest in the first instance within the economic
realm; the existence of social classes is a primary feature
of the structural organization of advanced capitalist
societies; economic power enables social, political and
ideological power; elites are the major initiators of action
within the capitalist democracies in the sense that they
routinely dominate decision-making processes and are
typically motivated to exercise power in a multiplicity of
ways according to self-interest; the structural organization
of advanced capitalist societies and the dominant economic or material relationships that characterize and define
the social order directly impact the production and
transmission of ideas; consciousness and the realm of
ideas will correspond with dominant material relationships
in ways that are both paradigmatic and hegemonic; and
social control is a necessary dimension of class rule that is
central to sustaining an unjust social order that in turn
sustains itself by perpetuating the social inequalities upon
which it is built.
Both conflict theory and the PM emphasize the
interrelations between the state, corporate capitalism and
the corporate media. Chomsky (1985:230) argued that the
state comprises the ‘actual nexus of decision-making
power … including investment and political decisions,
setting the framework within which the public policy can be
discussed and is determined.’ The government is
composed of the more visible agents of power, ‘whatever
groups happen to control the political system, one
component of the state system, at a particular moment’
(Chomsky, 1985:230). Within particular time and place
contexts, government is inherently transitory and is the
public face of power. It may be inferred from this that
power is manifest, made material, within dominant social
institutions, which in turn exercise and deploy power. Ways
in which power is deployed – materially, socially, politically
and ideologically – vary according to specific time and
place contexts. Highlighting the primacy of the statecorporate-media nexus in relation to decision-making
processes, both conflict theory and the PM theorize the
existence of class cohesion at the elite-level (see Klaehn,
2005a:16). That is, both recognize overlapping, mutual
interests among elites.
The PM acknowledges dissent and makes no
predications regarding the effectiveness of hegemonic
control (see Klaehn, 2003a, 2003b, 2005a:17-18, 2005b:
231, 2008; Mullen, 2009). Barker (2009) writes that:

The conscious intent of ruling elites to
manufacture public consent, while not monolithic
in its effectiveness – for the most part because of
vigorous grassroots activism – still exerts a
massive influence on the way people think about
domestic matters and especially foreign affairs.
Indeed, with the massive amount of money, time,
and technology poured into the dark art of
engineering consent, it should not be the least bit
surprising that corporate propaganda plays a
central part in shaping our lives (and in
destroying the lives of distant ‘others’). While
elites cannot always simply manufacture public
consent (as the public often holds vastly different
opinions to those propagated by the media), the
mass media has been remarkably successful at
manufacturing the general public’s contentedness and/or resignation to the idea that there is
no alternative to capitalism – both of which do
wonders to bolster the status quo. (At the same
time the media have almost completely censored
any critical discussion of their own antidemocratic influence on democracy, and have
neglected to examine how the funding of liberal
foundations works to undermine the Left – neither
of which is very surprising.) (Barker, 2009)
In specific relation to the role and function of
mainstream mass media within advanced capitalist
societies, both the PM and conflict theory accept as given
that: power meets meaning within media discourses; social
communication, popular culture, cultural politics and public
pedagogy reflect dominant material relationships (i.e.
existing social inequalities); political-economic elements
influence overall patterns of media performance, encouraging a systematic and pervasive right-wing bias within
media discourses that is consistent with the interests of
power; and careful analysis of media discourses and the
social, political and economic contexts in which these are
produced can enable insight into the dialectic between
ideology and power.
The Propaganda Model: Three Hypotheses and Five
Operative Principles
It is important to establish at the outset that the PM is
concerned with media behaviour rather than media effects.
Nevertheless, more than twenty years after its publication,
confusion abounds on this crucial distinction and it is,
perhaps, understandable. Consider, for example, this
excerpt from the Preface of Manufacturing Consent:
If … the powerful are able to fix the premises of
discourse, to decide what the general populace is
allowed to see, hear and think about, and to
‘manage’ public opinion by regular propaganda
-11-
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campaigns, the standard [liberal-pluralist] view of
how the media system works is at serious odds
with reality. (Herman and Chomsky, 1988, p. xi)

of their own stake in an issue or are immobilized by
effective propaganda, the media will serve elite interests
uncompromisingly’ (Herman, 1996). Conversely, Herman
and Chomsky concede that the ‘propaganda system’ does
not work as efficiently where there is dissensus: ‘the mass
media are not a solid monolith on all issues. Where the
powerful are in disagreement, there will be a certain
diversity of tactical judgements on how to attain generally
shared aims, reflected in media debate’ (Herman and
Chomsky, 1988, p.xii). Herman acknowledges that ‘there
are often differences within the elite which open up space
for some debate and even occasional (but very rare)
attacks on … the tactical means of achieving elite ends’
(Herman, 1996). Critically, however, the media do not stray
from the bounds of ‘thinkable thought’: Herman and
Chomsky reason that ‘views that challenge fundamental
premises or suggest that the observed modes of exercise
of state power are based on systemic factors will be
excluded from the mass media even when elite
controversy over tactics rages fiercely’ (Herman and
Chomsky, 1988, p.xii). It should be noted that, although
much broader in its analytical scope, the PM makes a
similar claim to that of the indexing hypothesis of mediastate relations put forward by Hallin (1986) and Bennett
(1990).
The second hypothesis advanced by Herman and
Chomsky is that where the media function under corporate
rather than state control, media behaviour is shaped by
what is, in effect, a ‘guided market system’ underpinned by
five filters – the operative principles of the PM. Herman
and Chomsky suggest that:

Or this, from the opening paragraph:
The mass media serve as a system for communicating messages and symbols to the general
populace. It is their function to amuse, entertain,
inform and inculcate individuals with the values,
beliefs and codes of behaviour that will integrate
them into the institutional structures of the larger
society. In a world of concentrated wealth and
major conflicts of class interest, to fulfil this role
requires systematic propaganda. (Ibid. p.1)
Indeed, the very title of the book, Manufacturing Consent,
and frequent references throughout to the ‘propaganda
system’, suggests that the PM was concerned with effects.
Although Herman and Chomsky have attended to the
societal function of ideology and propaganda as an
effective means of population control elsewhere in their
work (see Chomsky, 1989; Herman, 1999), the PM is
solely concerned with questions of media behaviour.
Situated firmly within the Marxist-radical tradition of
media studies, more specifically the political economy
approach, the PM effectively challenges the liberal-pluralist
view of the role of the media in a capitalist, liberaldemocratic regime such as the US – namely that it
constitutes the ‘fourth estate’ and functions as an effective
check on the exercise of power. Instead, Herman and
Chomsky argue that the media all too often serves the
interests of the economic and political elite. This does not
require direct intervention on the part of the corporate-state
nexus to determine media output, nor conspiracy on the
part of the journalists and other workers within the media
system to marginalize dissenting voices and reproduce the
status quo. Although cases of direct intervention (by
editors, shareholders, agents of the state, etc.) and
conspiracy (recycling stories known to be false, smears,
etc.) frequently occur, as revealed by Boyd-Barrett (2004)
and Edwards and Cromwell (2009), to give just two
examples, the PM provides a structural, political economy
framework to account for observed media bias in favour of
corporate and political elites’ power. Put simply, Herman
and Chomsky (1988: xii) insist that the PM presents a ‘free
market analysis’ of the media, ‘with the results largely the
outcome of the working of market forces.’
The PM proposes three hypotheses and is based upon
five operative principles. The starting point of the PM is the
existence, or not, of elite consensus. The first hypothesis
put forward by Herman and Chomsky is that, where there
is consensus amongst the corporate and political elite on a
particular issue, the media tend to reflect this in their
coverage of that issue, to the exclusion of rival viewpoints.
Herman asserts that ‘where the elite are really concerned
and unified, and/or where ordinary citizens are not aware

Money and power are able to filter out the news
fit to print, marginalise dissent and allow the
government and dominant private interests to get
their message across to the public. The essential
ingredients of our propaganda model, or set of
news ‘filters’, fall under the following headings:
(1) the size, concentrated ownership, owner
wealth and profit orientation of the dominant
mass-media firms; (2) advertising as the primary
income source of the mass media; (3) the
reliance of the media on information provided by
governments, business and ‘experts’ funded and
approved by these primary sources and agents of
power; (4) ‘flak’ as a means of disciplining the
media; and (5) ‘anti-communism’ as a national
religion and control mechanism. These elements
interact with and reinforce one another. The raw
material of news must pass through successive
filters, leaving only the cleansed residue fit to
print. They fix the premise of discourse and
interpretation, and the definitions of what is
newsworthy in the first place. (Herman and
Chomsky, 1988, p.2)
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The data presented by Herman and Chomsky in
support of the PM consisted of a series of case studies
based upon content analysis of newspaper coverage.
These include studies of the coverage of the murdered
Polish priest, Jerzy Popieluszko, and other religious victims
in Latin America; elections in El Salvador, Guatemala and
Nicaragua; the ‘KGB-Bulgarian plot’ to kill the Pope; and
the wars in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. The 2002
edition of Manufacturing Consent expanded the studies to
include mainstream media usage of the term ‘genocide’ to
describe events in East Timor, Iraq, Kosovo and Turkey;
plus the coverage of elections in Cambodia, Kenya,
Mexico, Russia, Turkey, Uruguay and Yugoslavia. Herman
and Chomsky also claimed that, in addition to foreign
policy matters, the PM could be applied to domestic policy
issues such as the North American Free Trade Agreement;
anti-globalization protests; the longstanding elite assault on
the labour movement; and the chemical industry and its
regulation. In all of these cases, Herman and Chomsky
found, media coverage reflected, rather than challenged,
elite interests.
Since its publication, many critical scholars have
presented evidence which supports the PM (see Herman,
1982, 1985, 1992; Parenti, 1986; Herman and O’Sullivan,
1989, 1991; Aronson, 1990; Lee and Solomon, 1990;
Chomsky, 1991; Winter, 1992, 1998, 2002, 2007; Gunn,
1994; McMurtry, 1998; Hammond and Herman, 2000;
Herman and Chomsky, 2002; Herring and Robinson,
2003b; Boyd-Barrett, 2004; Babe, 2005; Winter and
Klaehn, 2005; Phillips, 2007; Alford, 2010; Broudy, 2009).
Furthermore, although they did not utilize the PM, a
number of other scholars in Europe and North America
concurred that the media tended to manufacture consent
for elite preferences, both in terms of domestic and foreign
policy issues (see Miliband, 1969; Domhoff, 1979; Curtis,
1984; Glasgow University Media Group, 1985; Hallin,
1986; Hollingsworth, 1986; Bennett, 1990; Entman, 1991;
Philo and McLaughlin, 1993; Carruthers, 1995; Zaller and
Chui, 1996; Lashmar and Oliver, 1998; Mermin, 1999;
Greenslade, 2003; Knightley, 2003; Miller, 2004; Altheide,
2006; Anderson, 2006; Sussman, 2010).
The third hypothesis proffered by Herman and
Chomsky relates to the way in which the PM would be
received:

One prediction of the model is that it will be
effectively excluded from discussion. …However
well-confirmed the model may be … it is inadmissible, and … should remain outside the
spectrum of debate over the media. …Plainly it is
either valid or invalid. If invalid, it may be
dismissed; if valid it will be dismissed (emphasis
in original) (Ibid. p.11)
‘The first-order prediction of the Propaganda Model’, that
media behaviour conforms to and reflects the interests of
the economic and political elite (where the elite is united),
is ‘systematically confirmed’, Chomsky (Ibid. p.145)
declared – manifest in the overwhelmingly supportive
evidence discussed above.
In terms of the second-order prediction, that the PM
would be ignored by the media and within academia, the
evidence is again compelling. There have been only a few
mentions of Manufacturing Consent and/or the PM in the
European and North American media. In Britain, for
example, MediaLens (2004) reported that, since 1988, the
PM had been mentioned only once in The Guardian –
Britain’s most liberal broadsheet – while a Lexis-Nexis
database search found just ten mentions in other British
newspapers during this period.
Their work has also been marginalized within academia. Paradoxically, although Chomsky was described in
a New York Times book review as ‘arguably the most
important intellectual alive’ (Robinson, 1979) and although
he is one of the most cited scholars (see Massachusetts
Institute of Technology News Office, 1992; Times Higher
Education, 2009), Chomsky is generally ignored within the
social sciences. More accurately, while his linguistic work
receives critical acclaim, the disciplines of economics,
history, media and communication studies, politics and
sociology do not, generally speaking, engage with his
prodigious output in these areas. The same is true of
Herman, the main architect of the PM. As Chomsky himself
complained
…we’ve studied a great number of cases, from
every methodological point of view that we’ve
been able to think of – and they all support the
Propaganda Model. And by now there are
thousands of pages of similar material confirming
the thesis in books and articles by other people
too – in fact, I would hazard a guess that the
Propaganda Model is one of the best-confirmed
theses in the social sciences. There has been no
serious counter-discussion of it at all, actually,
that I’m aware of. (Chomsky in Mitchell and
Schoeffel, 2002:18)

[It] makes predictions at various levels. There are
first-order predictions about how the media
function. The model also makes second-order
predictions about how media performance will be
discussed and evaluated. … The general
prediction, at each level, is that what enters the
mainstream will support the needs of established
power. (Chomsky, 1989, p.153)

This bold claim has been substantiated; Mullen (2010a),
for example, surveyed 3,053 articles from ten media and
communication journals published in Europe and North
America (including the Canadian Journal of Commu-

More specifically,
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nication) over the 1988 to 2007 period to ascertain if and
how the PM was included in this scholarship. Of this
sample, only 79 articles (representing 2.6 per cent of the
total) attended to the PM. Importantly, rather than
engaging with the PM, most of these articles merely
included a reference to Manufacturing Consent in their
bibliographies. Likewise, out of 48 media and communication texts – typically used on British under-graduate
and postgraduate media and communication courses –
surveyed during the 1990 to 2007 period, only 11
(representing 22.9 per cent) actually engaged with the PM
(usually a few lines or paragraphs) and, of these, only four
texts contained an extensive discussion. The vast majority
either ignored the PM (43.8 per cent) or merely included
Manufacturing Consent in their bibliographies (33.3 per
cent) (Ibid.).
A further manifestation of their exclusion from
mainstream scholarship is the fact that, since the
publication of Manufacturing Consent and despite the
significance of the PM, there have been only three
conferences dedicated to discussing and critiquing their
work in this field. These included the ‘Distorting
Democracy’ conference in London (Britain) in February
2004; the ‘20 Years of Propaganda’ conference at the
University of Windsor (Canada) in May 2007; and the
‘Twenty Years of Propaganda’ conference at the University
of Northumbria in Newcastle-upon-Tyne (Britain) in
December 2009. With the exception of the Canadian
conference, these events were not that well attended.

‘propaganda system’ and downplayed popular opposition
to elite preferences (LeFeber, 1988); presented a
‘conspiratorial’ view of the media (Lemann, 1989; Entman,
1990a, 1990b; Nelson, 1990); constituted a blunt
instrument for analysis (Schudson, 1989); was ‘political’
(Salmon, 1989); was deterministic, functionalist and
simplistic (Schlesinger, 1989, 1992; Golding and Murdock,
1991; Eldridge, 1993); and neglected the impact of
journalistic professionalism (Goodwin, 1994; Hallin, 1994).
During the second wave of criticism, there was much
greater engagement with the PM and a number of more
substantial arguments were advanced. Focusing upon the
methodology and findings of the PM, these criticisms
resulted in a number of debates. The first exchange took
place between John Corner and Jeffery Klaehn in the
European Journal of Communication in 2002 and 2003.
Having rejected many of the early criticisms levelled at the
PM – its ‘conspiratorial’ view of the media, determinism
and functionalism, similarity to the gate-keeper model,
neglect of journalistic professionalism, failure to theorize
media effects, and assumption of unified ruling class
interests, Klaehn (2002a) restated the case for the PM,
focusing upon the five filters and its methodological
approach.
In response, Corner (2003) doubted whether the PM,
devised to explain the performance of the media in the US,
‘could be applied in countries with very different media
systems and political structures’ (Ibid. p.367). Corner
questioned what new theoretical insight the PM could bring
to European media research and complained that the PM’s
five filters were ‘assumed to function without much, if any,
need for further specification or qualification’ and resulted
in a ‘totalizing and finalizing view’ of media performance
(Ibid. p.369). Corner also critiqued the notion of a ‘filter’
and asked whether the filtering process itself produced the
resulting media messages or merely served to modify what
has already been produced. Corner charged that
proponents of the PM ignored the long-standing European
media research tradition, rooted in critical-Marxist
analyses, on media-state-market relations. In short, these
proponents do not situate the PM within this tradition, nor
acknowledge the antecedents upon which the PM is
founded. Corner questioned whether the PM supported or
rejected liberal principles (such as journalistic professionalism); whether media workers involved in the
propaganda system were conscious of its operation and
effects; and whether, by deploying notions such as
‘brainwashing under freedom’ and ‘thought control’, the PM
was indeed concerned with media effects rather than just
media behaviour.
In a 2003 article published in Journalism Studies,
Klaehn (2003a) explored criticisms that had been made of
the PM by both academics and commentators. He
exploded the myth that the model is conspiratorial, that it is
deterministic, that it fails to account for micro-processes of
media behaviour (which the structuralist PM never set out

Engagement with the Propaganda Model
Despite this general neglect, several commentators
and scholars have attended to the PM and its relative
merits (see Mullen, 2010b). This discourse reveals some
disturbing truths about the nature of the dominant
intellectual culture. The discourse can be divided into two
distinct phases: the first wave of criticism – in the late
1980s, following the book’s publication, and in the 1990s –
was marked by hostility, indifference and/or an outright
dismissal of the PM and its findings, while the second
wave of criticism, from the early 2000s, witnessed a
greater engagement with the PM which resulted in a
number of important debates. Furthermore, these
interventions can be categorized: some of these critiques
were motivated by ideological opposition to the PM (often
accompanied by vilification of Chomsky himself), some
objected to the methodology of the PM, while others
criticized the scope of the PM (its over-generalizations or,
conversely, its failure to theorize media behaviour and
media effects at the macro and micro-level).
During the first wave of criticism of the PM many
commentators and scholars, on both the political liberal-left
end of the spectrum and on the political right, generally
dismissed the PM. In their book reviews of Manufacturing
Consent and cursory discussions of the PM, these writers
charged that the PM overstated the power of the
-14SCAC
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to do), and that it fails to theorise audience effects (which
was never the intention of the PM).
In a further response, Klaehn (2003b) re-emphasized
the attractiveness of the PM from a social science
perspective, specifically the ease with which its predictions
could be empirically tested. Unlike Corner, who
characterized the PM as ‘closed’, Klaehn argued that the
operation of the five filters was contingent and variable; the
PM was thus relatively flexible and ‘open’. Klaehn criticized
Corner for not having recognized the limitations of the PM,
acknowledged by its creators, and stated that the PM did
not seek to explain all aspects of media performance.
Instead of rejecting the PM from a conceptual-theoretical
perspective, Klaehn encouraged scholars to test the
hypotheses that Herman and Chomsky put forward.
In a special issue of the Review of International Studies
in 2003 (Volume 29), a number of scholars debated the
significance of Chomsky’s work within the field of
international relations. Herring and Robinson (2003a,
p.551) stated that

preferences of official sources, and further study of
journalistic fears of flak from editors, the right-wing media
and government officials. Boyd-Barrett also suggested a
sixth filter: the ‘buying out’ of individual journalists or their
media by intelligence agencies, other government bodies
and/or special interest groups. Disputing Chomsky’s
stance on ‘conspiracy theory’, Boyd-Barrett pointed to the
1970s US Senate investigations and the ‘irrefutable
evidence of wide-scale, covert CIA penetration of media –
by definition, an illustration of ‘conspiracy’ at work’ (Ibid.
p.436).
The second exchange on the PM took place between
Kurt and Gladys Lang and Herman and Chomsky in the
Political Communication journal in 2004. Lang and Lang
(2004a) challenged the theoretical adequacy of the PM
and questioned whether it approximated how the media
functioned. The Langs advanced a number of criticisms.
They suggested that Herman and Chomsky were seeking
to make a political point in presenting their empirical data.
They also argued that Herman and Chomsky neglected to
provide information about their sampling and coding
procedures and they doubted the ‘the viability of a model
about ‘the media’ in general based on anecdotal evidence’
(Lang and Lang, 2004a:95). They challenged Herman and
Chomsky’s use of the term ‘genocide’ in their 2002 edition
of Manufacturing Consent. They complained that Herman
and Chomsky did not inquire how events became news
and charged that they assumed that information existed
but had been screened out of the media production
system. They acknowledged that the media production
process was routinized, pointing to the symbiotic
relationship between producers (sources) and conveyors
(editors and journalists), but argued that such relations
frequently became adversarial when interests diverged.
Furthermore, media owners often took risks and put out
material that politicians wished they had not. In short, there
was much interaction, both collaborative and
confrontational, between conveyors and sources. The
Langs argued that the media have an important
informational role and journalists have professional norms;
these help to prevent the media becoming a mere
mouthpiece for elite interests. They declared that the
media do provide space for alternative points of view,
particularly where there are divisions within the elite and
where there are significant (oppositional) political
movements. Concurrently, the Langs suggested that to talk
of a ‘propaganda system’ evaded the fact that Chomsky
can and does get his ‘deviant point of view’ (Ibid. p.97) into
the public domain through the very media he criticizes.
When it comes to coverage of events outside the US,
the Langs suggested there are cultural, institutional and
linguistic constraints that increased ‘the dependence of
journalists on embassy personnel and on other experts,
many of whom have connections, past or present, to the
government.’ However, they argued that these constraints,
which are consistent with the PM, are ‘less limiting when it
comes to covering events at home’ (Ibid.). They argued

Once we started to read Chomsky’s work, we
concluded that there was a great deal to be
learned from it. However, when we began to
draw on it, we came up against widespread
hostility towards his work combined with both
ignorance and misrepresentation of what he
writes.
In a further article, Herring and Robinson (2003b) observed
that the work of Hallin (1986) and Bennett (1990) – who
advanced an indexing hypothesis regarding media-state
relations – shared the same analytical framework as
Herman and Chomsky. Nevertheless, an examination of
eight major studies on the media and US foreign policy
found that ‘they only cite Hallin and/or Bennett, but not
Herman and Chomsky, despite offering arguments and
conclusions that overlap heavily with those of Herman and
Chomsky’ (Herring and Robinson, 2003b:558). In seeking
to explain this marginalization, Herring and Robinson
dismissed the personalized explanation – Chomsky’s
apparent ‘polemical’ style – and offered instead an
institutional explanation: the operation of the flak filter,
which discouraged anti-elite analyses and perspectives,
given that universities are part of the corporate-state
nexus.
Boyd-Barrett (2004:436), who accepted the basic
premises of the PM, complained that the PM did not
‘identify methodologies for determining the relative weight
of independent filters in different contexts’; lamented the
‘lack of precision in the characterization of some of the
filters’ in the PM; bemoaned the fact that the PM privileged
structural factors and ‘eschews or marginalizes
intentionality’; and called for the revision of the PM along
these lines. More specifically, in terms of sourcing and flak,
Boyd-Barrett recommended greater attention to journalistic
departures from, rather than routine conformity with, the
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that the media are themselves active players in elite
conflicts and some of these struggles involve criticisms of
media performance. They pointed out that the media do
scrutinize corporate scandals and the failures and
misdeeds of the US and its allies. Also, the Langs argued
that Chomsky misquoted the work of Walter Lippman and
others concerning the role of propaganda in society.
In their reply to the Langs, Herman and Chomsky
(2004a) raised a number of concerns. First, they complained about the Langs unjustifiably conflating the PM
with Chomsky’s political views. Second, they declared that
the sampling and coding procedures were clear and that
the empirical data could be checked; it was not anecdotal.
Third, they defended their use of the term ‘genocide’ and
accused the Langs of political bias in raising this point –
consistent with media’s own bias about ‘worthy’ and
‘unworthy’ victims. Fourth, they argued that they had tested
the PM using a range of cases that were important in
themselves and that received prominent media coverage.
They did not seek out promising cases. Fifth, in response
to the Langs’ claim that they did not focus on the media
production process, they argued that

Barsky (2006) celebrated Chomsky’s radicalism and traced
its impact upon Chomsky’s work, Noah Brahm (2006)
dismissed him and argued that Chomsky typified a
‘dangerous’ intellectual trend – authoritarian, narcissistic
and obsessive – governed by ‘an uptight psychology’ (Ibid.
p.454). In terms of the PM, Noah Brahm complained that
Herman and Chomsky had ignored the insights generated
by cultural studies (for example Barthes on semiotics,
Marcuse on ideology and Foucault on discourse) over the
last twenty years. However, as with the output during the
earlier phase of criticism, Noan Brahm did not engage with
the substance of the PM.
Sparks (2007), who, like Boyd-Barrett, was also
broadly in agreement with the PM, challenged Herman and
Chomsky’s claims about elite consensus/dissensus,
questioning the strategic-tactical dichotomy they posited,
and insisted that, not only are the capitalist class frequently
divided on account of their particularistic interests, but the
economic and political systems of other countries are quite
different from that of the US (on which the original PM was
based). In Europe, for example, Sparks highlighted the
existence of significant left-wing parties, the centrality of
public service broadcasters, the reality of sizeable working
class electorates, and the impact of competitive press
markets responding to partisan and socially stratified
polities. As a consequence of these, Sparks argued that
‘we would expect to find … a much wider and far-ranging
set of arguments in the media than simply in-house
disputes between different wings of the capitalist class’
(Ibid. p.74). Sparks emphasized the need to differentiate
between the performance and role of the elite media
compared to the mass media; argued that source
dependence did not guarantee journalistic compliance – as
elite sources may be disarticulated and divided thus
opening up the space for alternative, non-corporate and
non-state sources; and stipulated that journalists, on
account of their class position as wage labourers,
sometimes resist and contest the dictates of governments,
managers and owners.
With the exception of the constructive criticisms made
by Boyd-Barrett and Sparks – and the spirited defence of
the PM by Klaehn, Herring and Robinson, Barsky, and
Herman and Chomsky themselves – it is fair to say that
much of this engagement was poor and superficial; most of
these commentators and scholars did not engage with the
PM on its own terms, ascribing to it claims that Herman
and Chomsky never made, and they studiously avoided
the evidence marshalled by Herman and Chomsky,
offering no alternative explanations to account for the
observed performance of the media. Such blatant
avoidance flies in the face of good social science, wherein
scholars critique the premises and findings of each others’
research.
Misconceptions about the PM continue to enjoy wide
currency: in textbooks, university departments, classrooms
and on the worldwide web. Regarding the early anger and

Since we focus on how the available evidence
was selected and interpreted, we were very
definitely concerned with how newsworthy facts
are located, who the media rely on as sources,
how critically they treat them, what forces
determine what is newsworthy in the first place –
and how stories are inflated, repeated or
dropped, and how politically convenient fabrications may survive and even become
institutionalized. Our model deals with these
matters explicitly in describing sourcing processes, flak, ideology and other matters. But we
put our main emphasis on the empirical results of
media selection processes, which are crucial
facts about the media. (Ibid. p.105)
In short, theirs is a macro- rather than micro-level analysis
of the media production process. Sixth, they charged that
the Langs offered no explanation to account for the
radically different treatment of ‘worthy’ and unworthy’
victims by the media. Seventh, Chomsky defended his
interpretation and use of the work of Lippmann and others.
In response to Herman and Chomsky, Lang and Lang
(2004b) argued that the media production process was a
negotiated product, a social construction, and not one that
is controlled by the government or any one party. They
again questioned the empirical data presented by Herman
and Chomsky and they again challenged the use of the
term ‘genocide’. Herman and Chomsky (2004b), in turn,
responded to these points and rectified the mistakes made
by the Langs.
The third exchange on the PM took place between
Robert Barsky and Gabriel Noah Brahm in the Critical
Studies in Media Communication journal in 2006. Where
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hostility directed toward the PM, Herman (cited in Klaehn,
2008) states that:

evidence supportive of the PM’s arguments, which are also
seriously misrepresented within the overview presented in
the text. It bears noting again that Edward S. Herman was
actually the principal architect of the PM, and he is not
mentioned at all within the overview. Concurrently, as
explained above (also see Klaehn, 2002a, 2003a, 2003b),
the PM argues that patterns of media performance should
be understood as an outcome of market forces; it suggests
that political-economic elements influence overall patterns
of media performance. The PM is concerned to explore
media content in relation to what’s present within media
texts and also what’s absent, and the fact that the model is
flexible and easily tested makes it remarkably well-suited
for empirical research. Danesi’s claim that the PM casts
media as ‘a propaganda arm of the government’
fundamentally mischaracterizes the model. Danesi’s stress
on the ‘government in power’ is exactly the opposite of
what Chomsky argues (outlined above) regarding the demarcation between the government and the state (see
Edgley, 2009, for elaboration). Beyond this, as has been
repeatedly noted in literature on the PM, the HermanChomsky model is not deterministic. It does not argue that
media function solely to circulate propaganda, and it is in
fact a ‘model’ (as implied by the name given it by its
originators) as opposed to a ‘theory.’ Danesi continues,

The resistance and hostility to the propaganda
model had several sources. One is that it is a
radical critique, whose implication is that modest
reforms that don’t alter the structure very much
aren’t going to affect media performance very
much. This is hard for non-radicals to swallow.
Another source of resistance has been based on
our relatively broad brush strokes with which we
model a complex area. This makes it allegedly
too mechanistic and at the same time lacking in a
weighting of the elements in the model! But we
don’t claim that it explains everything and we are
clear that elite differences and local factors
(including features of individual media institutions) can influence media outcomes. We argue
that the model works well in many important
cases, and we await the offering of one that is
superior. But we also acknowledge that there
remains lots of room for media studies that do not
rest on the propaganda model. This same room
opens the way to criticizing the model for its
failure to pursue those tracks and fill those
spaces (Herman, cited in Klaehn, 2008).

Examples used by propaganda theorists to
support their view include mainstream American
television coverage of recent wars, from the
Vietnam War to the War on Terror (in
Afghanistan and Iraq), by which it is shown that
the government in power has the ability to
influence how the media present its coverage.

Critique that deliberately avoids the whole issue of
evidence and factual support for the PM continues to
persist (see Corner, 2003; Klaehn, 2003a, 2003b, 2005b,
2008), and it is extremely rare to find introductory
textbooks within the disciplines of cultural studies, media
and communication studies and sociology that even
mention the PM (see, for elaboration, Mullen, 2010a).
Consider, for instance, how the PM is represented in
the recently published introductory text, Popular Culture:
Introductory Perspectives, by Marcel Danesi, the editor-inchief of Semiotica, for instance:

Like Marxist scholars, propaganda theorists see
pop culture as an industry serving those in
power. Although people commonly believe that
the press has an obligation to be adversarial to
those in power, propaganda theorists argue that
the media are actually supportive of authority, for
the simple reason that the press is dependent on
the powerful for subsistence ... Like the Frankfurt
scholars, propaganda theorists do not seem to
believe that common people can tell the
difference between truth and manipulation. The
solution these theorists offer is to ensure that
access to public media is an open and
democratic process. Such access is, in fact,
becoming a reality because of the Internet, where
basically anyone can post an opinion and garner
an international audience for it, almost instantaneously. This very fact shows the untenability
of propaganda theory. If consent was really
manufactured in the populace as the theorists
claim, why is there so much dissent against the
war in Iraq online expressed by ordinary people?
To my mind, individuals’ web-based political

One of the more interesting contemporary
offshoots of culture industry theory is propaganda
theory, associated primarily with the writings of
the American linguist Noam Chomsky (b. 1928).
The theory posits that those who control the
funding and ownership of the media, and
especially the government in power, determine
how the media select and present news
coverage. The media thus become nothing more
than a propaganda arm of the government and
put forward mainly its point of view (Danesi,
2008:44).
Note that no reference is made and no reference is given
here to Manufacturing Consent – thereby leaving the
potentially (and probably) otherwise unknowing student
(presumably the ‘target audience’ for an introductory text
such as this one) with no signposts by which to seek
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critiques are evidence of the capacity of the
masses to resist indoctrination (Danesi, 2008:
45).

Herman and Chomsky have more recently commented that
the rise of the internet-age (blogging, podcasting, etc.) has
not limited or lessened the applicability of the PM (see
Mullen, 2009).
As highlighted above, the PM is often simply ignored in
scholarly debates surrounding media performance. A
recent special issue of the Canadian Journal of Communication, devoted to ‘Rethinking Public Relations’,
illustrates such marginalization. Miller (2009) observed that
the journal opens with an editorial which approvingly cites
PR apologist Ray Hiebert’s famous claim that ‘without
public relations, democracy could not succeed in mass
society’ (cited in Greenberg and Knight, 2009:183). The
editorial concludes with the declaration that ‘PR is a
contested and contradictory domain that lacks a unified
professional identity or theoretical framework’ (Greenberg
and Knight, 2009:186). The PM is not mentioned. The vast
literature devoted to radical mass media criticism is simply
ignored, and media impact in relation to the whole issue of
manufacturing compliance and conflict theory’s suggestion
that the corporate-state-media nexus is directly relevant
and crucial to study of discursive phenomena is entirely
avoided. Such exclusion reflects and reinforces an
intellectual culture which is steeped in ideological and
personal bias. The journal begins with an article devoted to
examining corporate crisis response strategy that is almost
wholly uncritical (Greenberg and Elliot, 2009) in terms of its
engagement with the intersection between communicative
power and political economy.

And thus ends Danesi’s overview of the PM. Exactly who
these ‘propaganda theorists’ are – it bears noting – is not
entirely clear, as no references are included within his
discussion. As recent research indicates, the PM has
international resonance and scholars from Canada, the
United States and Europe have demonstrated its
applicability – testing the PM in terms of a wide range of
domestic and international topics and issues (for a
comprehensive listing of such studies, see SourceWatch,
2010; see also Klaehn, 2009; Mullen 2010a, 2010b; Mullen
and Klaehn, 2010).
It is certainly true that the PM argues, in the first
instance, that media discourses are shaped by market
forces. This is ‘for the simple reason’ that the ownership,
size and profit orientation of the dominant media impact
significantly upon the contexts in which discourses are
conceived and produced (see Bagdikian, 1992; Lee and
Solomon, 1990; Golding and Murdock, 1991; Murdock and
Golding, 1977; McChesney, 1999, 2008; Klaehn, 2010).
The PM does not assume that media are monolithic, nor
does it ignore dissent. Chomsky has described the media
system as inherently unstable (see Chomsky, 1997a;
Klaehn, 2003b, 2005b:231) and the PM makes no claims
regarding how effective media may or may not be.
Evidence suggests, however, that the media are extremely
effective in influencing public discourse (see Winter, 1992,
2007; Klaehn, 2003b, 2010; Miller, 2004; Everton, 2005;
Eglin, 2005; Jensen, 2005; Winter and Klaehn, 2005;
Scatambulo-D’Annibale, 2005; Ginsberg, 1986; Lee and
Solomon, 1990) and are also influential politically (see
Winter, 2002, 2007; Sussman, 2007, 2010; Chomsky,
1989, 1991; Herman, 1985, 1999; Herman and O’Sullivan,
1991; McMurtry, 1989; Klaehn, 2002b, 2006b, 2006d;
Edwards and Cromwell, 2005, 2009; Cromwell, 2006).
Moreover, Herman (2000) has replied to suggestions that
the Internet weakens and/or disproves the PM, stating that:

Conclusion
Alex Carey (1995:18) observed that the 20th century
has ‘been characterized by three developments of great
political importance: the growth of democracy, the growth
of corporate power and the growth of corporate propaganda as a means of protecting corporate power against
democracy.’ The long-standing aim of corporate propaganda, the control of the ‘public mind’ was also identified
by Marx and Engels (1970 [1845], p.64): ‘Each new class
which puts itself in the place of one ruling before it is
compelled, merely in order to carry through its aim, to
represent its interest as the common interest of all the
members of society.’ Accordingly,

Some argue that the Internet and the new
communication technologies are breaking the
corporate stranglehold on journalism and opening an unprecedented era of interactive democratic media. There is no evidence to support this
view as regards journalism and mass communication. In fact, one could argue that the new
technologies are exacerbating the problem. They
permit media firms to shrink staff even as they
achieve greater outputs, and they make possible
global distribution systems that reduce the
number of media entities. Although the new
technologies have great potential for democratic
communication, there is little reason to expect the
Internet to serve democratic ends if it is left to the
market.

The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch
the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling
material force of society, is at the same time the
ruling intellectual force. The class which has the
means of material production at its disposal has
control at the same time over the means of
mental production, so that thereby, generally
speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means
of mental production are subject to it [emphasis
in original] (Ibid.).
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authors also gratefully acknowledge helpful comments and
suggestions offered by reviewers.

The objective is ruling class hegemony, where the ideology
of the capitalist class not only justifies its power but gains
the active consent of the oppressed in their oppression.
The Italian Marxist, Antonio Gramsci, defined hegemony
as:

References

…an order in which a certain way of life and
thought is dominant; in which one concept of
reality is diffused throughout society in all its
institutional and private manifestations, informing
with its spirit all tastes, morality, customs,
religious and political principles, and all social
relations, particularly in their intellectual and
moral connotations (cited in Williams, 1960: 586).

Adorno, T. and Horkheimer, M. 1972 The Dialectic of
Enlightenment. New York: Herder and Herder.
Alford, Matthew 2009 ‘A Propaganda Model for Hollywood,’
Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture,
6(2), pp. 144-156.
__________. 2010 Reel Power: Hollywood Cinema and
American Supremacy. London: Pluto Press.
Altheide, David 2006 Terrorism and the Politics of Fear.
Lanham, Massachusetts: AltaMira Press.
Althusser, Louis 1969 For Marx. London: Allen Lane.
__________. 1971 ‘Ideology and Ideological State
Apparatuses’ in Althusser, L. Lenin and Philosophy and
Other Essays. London: New Left Books.
Andersen, Robin 2006 A Century of Media, A Century of
War. New York: Peter Lang.
Aronson, James 1990 The Press and the Cold War,
Revised Edition. New York: Monthly Review Press.
Babe, Robert 2005 ‘Newspaper Discourses on
Environment’ in Jeffery Klaehn (ed.) Filtering the News:
Essays on Herman and Chomsky’s Propaganda Model,
London: Black Rose Books.
Bagdikian, Ben 1992 The New Media Monopoly, Fourth
Edition. Boston: Beacon Press.
Baran, P. and Sweezy, P. 1969 ‘Theses on Advertising’ in
Baran, P. (ed.) The Longer View. New York: Monthly
Review Press.
Barker, Michael J. 2009 ‘Blame the Media,’ Swans
Commentary, online at: http://www.swans.com/library/
art15/barker16.html [accessed July 25, 2009]
Robert Barsky 2006 ‘Anarchism, the Chomsky Effect and
the Descent from the Ivory Tower,’ Critical Studies in
Media Communication, 23(5), pp. 446-452.
Bennett, Lance 1990 ‘Towards a Theory of Press-State
Relations in the United States’, Journal of
Communication, 40(2), pp. 103-25.
Berry, David 2010 ‘Radical Mass Media Criticism, History
and Theory,’ in Jeffery Klaehn (ed.), The Political
Economy of Media and Power, New York: Peter Lang,
pp. 319-36.
Berry, David and John Theobald (eds.) 2006 Radical Mass
Media Criticism. London: Black Rose Books.
Bourdieu, Pierre 1991. Language and Symbolic Power.
Cambridge: Polity.
__________. 1996 Sur la télévision, Paris, Liber-Raisons
d'Agir. Translation (1998) On Television and
Journalism. London, Pluto.
Boyd-Barrett, Oliver 2004 ‘Judith Miller, the New York
Times and the Propaganda Model’, Journalism Studies,
5(4), pp. 435-449.
Broudy, Daniel 2009 ‘The Propaganda of Patriotism and

The corporate and political elites developed a number of
means to achieve such hegemony. These included
advertising and the promotion of consumerism (Packard,
1957; Baran and Sweezy, 1969; Ewen, 1976), corporate
control of the media, shaping the education system and the
deployment of concerted propaganda campaigns (Miliband, 1973; Schmidt, 2001; Giroux, 2001, 2010; Jhally,
2006; Jensen, 2005, 2006; Bagdikian, 1992; Herman,
1985, 1999; Herman and Chomsky, 1988; Herman and
McChesney, 1997; Dinan and Miller, 2007; Winter, 2007;
Miller and Dinan, 2007, 2008; Alford, 2010; Klaehn, 2010).
The PM analytically engages with the question of how
corporate and political power influence patterns of media
performance, and as such is directly relevant to the
question of how ideological power and discursive phenomena may be explored sociologically, particularly within
the theoretical traditional associated with conflict theory.
Concurrently, the model complements other (competing)
approaches and creates new opportunities for both
empirical research and renewed theoretical debate concerning media and society.
The discipline of sociology is non-dogmatic and multiparadigmatic and C. Wright Mills (1959:5) proclaimed that
the great promise of sociology is that it inspires what he
called the sociological imagination: ‘a quality of mind that
will help [people] to use information and to develop reason
in order to achieve lucid summations of what is going on in
the world and of what may be happening within themselves.’ Mills believed intellectuals should embrace critical
scholarship that engages with power and – beyond this –
he believed that intellectuals should also strive for public
relevance. This article has suggested that the HermanChomsky PM, as a democratic and critical model that
engages directly with how economic, social, and political
power intersect with communicative power, represents a
pathway for achieving these aims.

Acknowledgements
For helpful editorial suggestions and the sharing of new
research, the authors extend thanks to Dan Broudy. The
-19SCAC

10-23 | vol. 1 | no. 1 | Autumn 2010

ISSN 1883-5953

S
C
A
C_____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Color,’ Synaesthesia, 1(1), pp. 1-9.
Carey, Alex 1995 Taking the Risk Out of Democracy.
Sydney NSW, Australia: University of New South Wales
Press.
Carruthers, Susan 1995a Winning Hearts and Minds:
British Governments, the Media and Counterinsurgency, 1944-1960. London: Leicester University
Press.
__________. 1995b ‘A Red Under Every Bed? AntiCommunist Propaganda and Britain’s Response to
Colonial Insurgency’, Contemporary Record, 9(2), pp.
294-318.
Chomsky, Noam 1985 Turning the Tide: US Intervention in
Central America and the Struggle for Peace. London:
Pluto.
__________. 1988 Language and Politics. Montreal: Black
Rose Books.
__________. 1989 Necessary Illusions: Thought Control in
Democratic Societies. Toronto, Ontario: CBC
Enterprises.
__________. 1991 ‘International Terrorism: Image and
Reality’ in George, A. (ed.) Western State Terrorism.
London: Polity.
__________. 1997a Media Control: The Spectacular
Achievements of Propaganda. New York: Seven Stories
Press.
__________. 1997b ‘What Makes Mainstream Media
Mainstream,’ Z Magazine, reprinted online at:
http://www.chomsky.info/articles/199710-.htm
[accessed October 20, 2010]
__________. 1998 The Common Good. Interviews with
David Barsamian. Berkeley, CA: Odonian.
Corner, John 2003 ‘Debate: The Model in Question – A
Response to Klaehn on Herman and Chomsky’,
European Journal of Communication, 18(3), pp. 367375.
Cromwell, David 2006 ‘Absurd Silence and Misplaced
Pragmatism: How Dissent Is Kept To Manageable
Levels’ in Jeffery Klaehn (ed.), Bound by Power:
Intended Consequences (Montreal: Black Rose Books),
pp. 90-104.
Curtis, Liz 1984 Ireland and the Propaganda War: The
British Media and the ‘Battle for Hearts and Minds.’
London: Pluto.
Danesi, Marcel 2008 Popular Culture: Introductory
Perspectives. New York: Rowman and Littlefield.
Dinan, William and David Miller (eds.) 2007 Thinker Faker
Spinner Spy: Corporate PR and the Assault on
Democracy. London: Pluto.
Domhoff, William 1979 The Powers That Be: Processes of
Ruling Class Domination in America, New York:
Vintage Books.
Edgley, Alison 2009 ‘Manufacturing Consistency: Social
Science, Rhetoric and Chomsky’s Critique,’
Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture,
(6)2, pp. 23-42.
Edwards, David and David Cromwell 2005 Guardians of

Power: The Myth of the Liberal Media. London: Pluto
Press, 2005.
__________. 2009 Newspeak in the 21st Century, London:
Pluto.
Eglin, Peter 2005 ‘Propaganda and its Affordances: El
Salvador and the Globe and Mail and the Question of
Intellectual Responsibility’ in Filtering the News: Essays
on Herman and Chomsky’s Propaganda Model, Jeffery
Klaehn (ed). Montreal: Black Rose Books, pp. 95-119.
Eldridge, John (ed.) 1993 Getting the Message. New York:
Routledge.
Entman, Robert 1991 ‘Framing US Coverage of
International News: Contrasts in Narratives of the KAL
and Iran Air Disasters’, Journal of Communication,
41(4), pp. 6-27.
__________. 2004 Projections of Power: Framing News,
Public Opinion and US Foreign Policy. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Ewen, S. 1996 PR! A Social History of Spin, New York:
Basic Books.
Everton, Robert 2005 ‘Israel Asper and Israeli Propaganda’
in Filtering the News: Essays on Herman and
Chomsky’s Propaganda Model, Jeffery Klaehn (ed).
Montreal: Black Rose Books, pp. 63-94.
Fairclough, Norman 1989 Language and Power. London:
Longman.
__________. 1995a. Media Discourse. New York: Edward
Arnold.
__________. 1995b. Critical Discourse Analysis. Boston:
Addison Wesley.
__________. 2002. ‘Language in New Capitalism,’
Discourse & Society, 13(2), pp. 163-166.
Flacks, David 1991 ‘Making History and Making Theory:
Notes on How Intellectuals Seek Relevance’ in
Intellectuals and Politics: Social Theory in a Changing
World. Sage: Newbury Park, pp. 3-18.
Ginsberg, Benjamin 1986 The Captive Public: How Mass
Opinion Promotes State Power, New York: Basic
Books.
Giroux, Henry 2001 The Mouse That Roared: Disney and
the End of Innocence. New York: Rowman and
Littlefied.
__________. 2010 ‘Public Pedagogy, Cultural Politics and
the Biopolitics of Militarization’ in Jeffery Klaehn (ed.),
The Political Economy of Media and Power, New York:
Peter Lang, pp. 181-204.
Glasgow University Media Group 1985 War and Peace
News, Milton Keynes: Open University Press.
Golding, Peter and Graham Murdock 1991 ‘Culture,
Communications and Political Economy’ in James
Curran and Michael Gurevitch (eds.), Mass Media and
Society. London: Edward Arnold.
Goodwin, Jeff 1994 ‘What’s right (and wrong) about left
media criticism? Herman and Chomsky's propaganda
model, Sociological Forum, 9(1), pp. 101-11.
Greenberg, Josh and Elliott Charlene 2009 ‘A Cold-cut
crisis: Food-borne illness, legitimation problems and
-20-

SCAC

10-23 | vol. 1 | no. 1 | Autumn 2010

ISSN 1883-5953

S
C
A
C_____________________________________________________________________________________________________

corporate apologia.’ Canadian Journal of
Communication, 34(2), pp. 189-204.
Greenberg, Josh and Graham Knight 2009 ‘Rethinking
Public Relations,’ Canadian Journal of Communication,
34(2), pp. 183-7.
Greenslade, Roy 2003 Press Gang: How Newspapers
Make Profit from Propaganda, London: Pan Books.
Golding, Peter and Graham Murdock 1991 ‘Culture,
Communications and Political Economy’ in J. Curran
and M. Gurevitch (eds.), Mass Media and Society.
London: Edward Arnold.
Gunn, Geoffrey 1994 A Critical View of Western
Journalism and Scholarship on East Timor. Sydney:
Journal of Contemporary Asian Studies.
Hall, Stuart 1980 ‘Encoding/Decoding’ in Hall, S. et al
(Eds.) Culture, Media, Language. London: Hutchinson.
Hallin, Daniel C. 1986 The Uncensored War, Berkeley:
University of California Press.
Herman, Edward S. 1985 ‘Diversity of News:
‘Marginalizing’ the Opposition,’ Journal of
Communication, 35 (Summer), pp. 135-46.
__________. 1996 ‘The Propaganda Model Revisited’ in
the Monthly Review (July); reprinted online at
http://musictravel.free.fr/political/political7.htm
(accessed on October 21, 2009)
__________. 1992 Beyond Hypocrisy: Decoding the News
in an Age of Propaganda. Boston: South End Press.
__________. 1999 The Myth of the Liberal Media. New
York: Peter Lang Publishing.
__________. 2000 ‘The Propaganda Model: A
Retrospective’, Journalism Studies, 1(1), 101-112.
Reprinted online at: http://www.human-nature.com/
reason/01/herman.html [accessed April 10, 2009]
Herman, Edward S. and Noam Chomsky 1988
Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the
Mass Media. New York: Pantheon.
__________. 2004a ‘Reply to Kurt and Gladys Engel
Lang,’ Political Communication, 21, pp. 103-7.
__________. 2004b ‘Further Reply to the Langs,’ Political
Communication, 21, pp. 113-6.
Herman, Edward S. and Gerry O’Sullivan 1991 ‘“Terrorism’
as Ideology and Cultural Industry’ in George, A. (ed.)
Western State Terrorism. London: Polity Press.
Herring, Eric and Piers Robinson 2003a ‘Forum on
Chomsky: Introduction,’ Review of International Studies,
29, pp.551-2.
__________. 2003b ‘Too Polemical or Too Critical?
Chomsky on the Study of the News Media and US
Foreign Policy’, Review of International Studies, 29, pp.
553-68.
Hollingsworth, Mark 1986 The Press and Political Dissent:
A Question of Censorship, London: Pluto.
Jensen, Robert 2005 ‘Dan Rather and the Problem with
Patriotism’ in Filtering the News: Essays on Herman
and Chomsky’s Propaganda Model, Jeffery Klaehn
(ed). Montreal: Black Rose Books, pp. 120-137.
__________. 2006 ‘The Myth of the Neutral Professional’

in Bound by Power: Intended Consequences, Jeffery
Klaehn (ed.). Montreal: Black Rose Books, pp. 64-71.
Jacoby, Russell 1987 The Last Intellectuals: American
Culture in the Age of the Academe. New York: Noonday
Press.
Jhally, Sut 2006 Spectacle of Accumulation: Essays in
Culture, Media and Politics. New York: Peter Lang.
Knighley, Philip 2003 The First Casualty: The War
Correspondent as Hero, Propagandist and Myth-maker
from the Crimea to Iraq, Third Edition, London: André
Deutsch.
Klaehn, Jeffery 2002a ‘A Critical Review and Assessment
of Herman and Chomsky’s Propaganda Model of Media
Operations,’ European Journal of Communication,
17(2), pp. 147-182.
__________. 2002b Corporate Hegemony and the
Marginalization of Dissent: A Critical Assessment and
Review of the Globe and Mail’s News Coverage of
Near-Genocide in Occupied East Timor, 1975-1980,’
International Communication Gazette, 64(4), pp. 301321.
__________. 2003a ‘Behind the Invisible Curtain of
Scholarly Criticism: Revisiting the Propaganda Model,’
Journalism Studies, 4(3), pp. 359-369.
__________. 2003b ‘Model Construction, Various Other
Epistemological Concerns: A Reply to John Corner’s
Commentary on the Propaganda Model,’ European
Journal of Communication, 18(3), pp. 377-383.
__________. 2005a ‘A Critical Review and Assessment of
Herman and Chomsky’s Propaganda Model’ in Filtering
the News: Essays on Herman and Chomsky’s
Propaganda Model, Jeffery Klaehn (ed). Montreal:
Black Rose Books.
__________. 2005b ‘Behind the Invisible Curtain of
Scholarly Criticism: Revisiting the propaganda model’ in
Filtering the News: Essays on Herman and Chomsky’s
Propaganda Model, Jeffery Klaehn (ed). Montreal:
Black Rose Books.
__________. 2006a ‘Understanding Power: An Interview
with Noam Chomsky’ in Jeffery Klaehn (ed.), Bound by
Power: Intended Consequences. Montreal: Black Rose
Books, pp. 1-11.
__________. 2006b ‘The Meta-Program of Power: An
Interview with John McMurtry’ in Jeffery Klaehn (ed.),
Bound by Power: Intended Consequences Montreal:
Black Rose Books, pp. 105-118.
__________. 2006c ‘(Un)Spinning Social Inequality: An
Interview with David Miller’ in Jeffery Klaehn (ed.),
Bound by Power: Intended Consequences Montreal:
Black Rose Books, pp. 52-63.
__________. 2006d ‘Demystifying Global Capitalism, the
Cult of Impotence, and Social Inequality: An Interview
with Linda McQuaig’ in Jeffery Klaehn (ed.), Bound by
Power: Intended Consequences. Montreal: Black Rose
Books, pp. 46-51. Excerpt online at: http:www.-fifthEstate.online.co.uk/comment/mcquaiginterview.html
__________. 2006e ‘On Power and Dissent: An Interview
-21-

SCAC

10-23 | vol. 1 | no. 1 | Autumn 2010

ISSN 1883-5953

S
C
A
C_____________________________________________________________________________________________________

with Brian Martin’ in Jeffery Klaehn (ed.), Bound by
Power: Intended Consequences. Montreal: Black Rose
Books, pp. 72-89.
__________. 2008 ‘Media, Power and the Origins of the
Propaganda Model: An Interview with Edward S.
Herman.’ Fifth Estate Online: The International Journal
of Radical Mass Media Criticism. Online at: http://www.
fifth-estate-online.co.uk/comment/mediapower.html
[accessed December 7, 2010]
__________. 2009 ‘The Propaganda Model: Theoretical
and Methodological Considerations,’ Westminster
Papers in Communication and Culture, 6(2), pp. 43-58.
Online at: http://www.wmin.ac.uk/mad/page-2203
[accessed November 20, 2010]
__________. 2010 The Political Economy of Media and
Power, Jeffery Klaehn (ed.), New York: Peter Lang.
Lang, Kurt and Gladys Engel Lang 2004a ‘Noam Chomsky
and the Manufacture of Consent for American Foreign
Policy.’ Political Communication, (21), pp.93-101.
__________. 2004b ‘Response to Herman and Chomsky,’
Political Communication, (21), pp. 109-111
Lashmar, Paul and James Oliver 1998 Britain’s Secret
Propaganda War, 1948-1977, Stroud: Sutton
Publishing.
Lee, Martin and Norman Solomon 1990 Unreliable
Sources: A Guide to Detecting Bias in the News Media.
New York: Carol.
LeFeber, W. 1988 ‘Whose news?’ New York Times, 6
November.
Lemann, Nicholas 1989 ‘Book Reviews’, The New
Republic, 9 January.
Marcuse, Herbert 1968 One Dimensional Man. London:
Sphere.
Marx, Karl 1956 Selected Writings in Sociology and Social
Philosophy. T. Bottomore and M. Rubel (eds.). London:
Watts.
Marx, Karl and Engels, Friedrich 1970 [1845] The German
Ideology. London: Lawrence and Wishart.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology News Office 1992
‘Chomsky is Citation Champ’, 15 April. Available online
at: http://web.mit.edu/newsoffice/1992/citation0415.html
(accessed September 11, 2009).
McChesney, Robert 1999 Rich Media, Poor Democracy:
Communication Politics in Dubious Times. Chicago:
University of Illinois Press.
__________. 2008 The Political Economy of Media:
Enduring Issues, Emerging Dilemmas. New York:
Monthly Review Press.
McMurtry, John 1998 Unequal Freedoms: The Global
Market as an Ethical System. Toronto: Garamond
Press.
MediaLens 2004 ‘MediaAlert: A Few Simple Truths –
Propaganda, Power and Moral Truisms.’ 12 February
[Available at www.medialens.org (accessed on 10
December 2008)].
Mermin, John (1999) Debating War and Peace, Princeton
(New Jersey): Princeton University Press.

Miliband, R. (1969) The State in Capitalist Society: The
Analysis of the Western System of Power, London:
Weidenfeld and Nicholson.
Miller, David 2004 Tell Me Lies: Propaganda and Media
Distortion in the Attack on Iraq, David Miller (ed.).
London: Pluto.
__________. 2007 ‘Spinning Farmed Salmon’ in Thinker
Faker Spinner Spy: Corporate PR and the Assault on
Democracy, William Dinan and David Miller (eds.).
London: Pluto.
__________. 2009 ‘Going in for the kill: the “kettling” role
of PR in science and research,’ Spinwatch, July 17,
2009. Online at: http://www.spinwatch.org/blogs-main
Menu-29/david-miller-unspun-mainmenu-31/5307-go
-in-for-the-kill-the-role-of-pr-in-science-and-research
(accessed November 19, 2010)
Miller, David and William Dinan 2007 ‘Public Relations and
the Subversion of Democracy’ in Thinker Faker Spinner
Spy: Corporate PR and the Assault on Democracy,
William Dinan and David Miller (eds.). London: Pluto.
__________. 2008 A Century of Spin: How Public
Relations Became the Cutting Edge of Corporate
Power. London: Pluto.
Mitchell, Peter R. and John Schoeffel (eds.) 2002
Understanding Power: The Indispensable Chomsky.
New York: The New Press.
Mills, C. Wright 1959 The Sociological Imagination. New
York: Oxford University Press.
Mullen, Andrew 2008 ‘Twenty Years at the Margins: The
Herman-Chomsky Propaganda Model, 1988-2008.’
Fifth Estate Online: The International Journal of Radical
Mass Media Criticism. Online at: http://www.fifth-estateonline.co.uk/comment/twentyyears.html [accessed
March 3, 2009]
__________. 2009 ‘The Propaganda Model After
Twenty Years: An Interview with Edward S. Herman
and Noam Chomsky,’ Westminster Papers in
Communication and Culture, 6(2), p. 20. Online at:
http://www.wmin.ac.uk/mad/page-2203
__________. 2010a, 'Twenty Years On: The second-order
prediction of the Herman-Chomsky Propaganda Model,'
Media, Culture and Society, 32(4), pp. 1-18.
__________. 2010b ‘Bringing Power Back In: The
Herman-Chomsky Propaganda Model, 1998-2008’ in
Jeffery Klaehn (ed.), The Political Economy of Media
and Power, New York: Peter Lang.
Mullen, Andrew and Jeffery Klaehn 2010 ‘The HermanChomsky Propaganda Model: A Critical Approach to
Analyzing Mass Media Behaviour,’ Sociology Compass,
4(4), pp. 215-229.
Murdock, Graham and Golding, Peter 1977 ‘Capitalism,
Communication and Class Relations’ in Curran et al.
(eds.) Mass Communication and Society. London:
Edward Arnold.
Nelson, Joyce 1989 Sultans of Sleeze: Public Relations
and the Mass Media. Toronto: Between the Lines.
Noah Brahm Jr., Gabriel 2006 ‘Understanding Noam
-22-

SCAC

10-23 | vol. 1 | no. 1 | Autumn 2010

ISSN 1883-5953

S
C
A
C_____________________________________________________________________________________________________

Chomsky: A Reconsideration', Critical Studies in Media
Communication, 23(5), pp. 453-461
Packard, Vance 1957 The Hidden Persuaders. New York:
Pocket Books.
Parenti, Michael 1986 Inventing Reality: The Politics of the
Mass Media. New York: St Martins.
Philo, Greg and McLaughlin, Greg (1993) The British
Media and the Gulf War, Glasgow: Glasgow University
Media Group.
Pilger, John 1998 Hidden Agendas. London: Vintage.
Poulantzas, Nicos 1975 Classes in Contemporary
Capitalism. London: New Left Books.
Rai, Milan 1995 Chomsky’s Politics. New York: Verso.
Robinson, Paul 1979 ‘The Chomsky Problem’, New York
Times, 25 February.
Salmon, Charles T. 1989 ‘Review of Manufacturing
consent, by Herman and Chomsky,’ Journalism
Quarterly, 66 (Summer), pp. 494-95
Schlesinger, Philip 1989 ‘From Production to Propaganda’,
Media, Culture and Society, vol.11, pp. 283-306.
__________. 1992 ‘From production to propaganda’ in
Media, Culture and Society: A Reader. London: Sage.
Scatamburlo-D’Annibale, Valerie 2005 ‘In “Sync”: Bush’s
War Propaganda Machine and the American
Mainstream Media’ in Filtering the News: Essays on
Herman and Chomsky’s Propaganda Model, Jeffery
Klaehn (ed). Montreal: Black Rose Books, pp. 21-62.
Schmidt, Jeff 2001 Disciplined Minds: A critical look at
salaried professionals and the soul-battering system
that shapes their lives. Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield.
Schudson, Michael 1989 ‘The sociology of news
production’, Media, Culture and Society, 11(3), pp. 263282.
SourceWatch 2010 ‘Propaganda Model’ web-page, online
at: http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Propa
ganda_Model [accessed November 12, 2010]
Sparks, Colin 2005 ‘Extending and Refining the Propaganda Model’, Westminster Papers in Communication
and Culture, 4(2), pp. 68-84.
Sussman, Gerry 2007 ‘Globalizing Politics: Spinning US
“Democracy Assistance” Programs,’ in Thinker Faker
Spinner Spy: Corporate PR and the Assault on
Democracy, William Dinan and David Miller (eds.).
London: Pluto.
__________. 2010 Branding Democracy: US Regime
Change in Post-Soviet Eastern Europe. New York:
Peter Lang.
Times Higher Education 2009 ‘Most cited authors of books
in the Humanities, 2007’, Times Higher Education,
March, p. 21.
Theobald, John 2006 ‘The Intellectual Tradition of Radical
Mass Media Criticism: A Framework,’ Fifth-EstateOnline: The International Journal of Radical Mass
Media Criticism. Online at: http://www.fifth-estate-online
.co.uk/criticism/theintellectualtradition.html (accessed
August 15, 2009)
Tuchman, Gaye 1978 Making News: A Study in the

Construction of Reality. New York: Free Press.
Van Dijk, Teun 1983 ‘Discourse Analysis: Its Development
and Application to the Structure of News,’ Journal of
Communication (2), pp. 11-32.
__________. 1988 News Analysis: Case Studies of
International News in the Press. New Jersey, LEA.
__________. 2008 Discourse and Power. New York:
Palgrave MacMillan.
Walzer, Michael 1988 The Company of Critics: Social
Criticism in the Twentieth Century. New York: Basic
Books.
Winter, James 1992 Common Cents. Montreal: Black
Rose.
__________. 1998 Democracy’s Oxygen: How the
Corporations Control the News. Montreal: Black Rose
Books.
__________. 2002 MediaThink. Montreal: Black Rose
Books.
__________. 2007 Lies Media Tell Us. Montreal: Black
Rose Books.
Winter, James and Jeffery Klaehn 2005 ‘The Propaganda
Model Under Protest’ by James Winter and Jeffery
Klaehn, in Jeffery Klaehn (ed.), Filtering the News:
Essays on Herman and Chomsky’s Propaganda Model.
Montreal: Black Rose Books, pp. 164-186.
Wintonick, Peter and Mark Achbar 1994 Manufacturing
Consent: Noam Chomsky and the Media. Montreal:
Black Rose.
Zaller, John Raymond and Dennis Chui 1996
‘Government’s Little Helper: US Press Coverage of
Foreign Policy Crisis, 1945-1991’, Political
Communication, vol. 13, pp. 385-405.

-23SCAC

10-23 | vol. 1 | no. 1 | Autumn 2010

ISSN 1883-5953

